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Essays
Blaming Culture for Bad Behavior
Let Volpp*
INTRODUCTION
When do we call behavior "cultural"? And when do we not? Why
do we distinguish behavior in this way? And what are the
consequences of this difference in recognition and naming? This
Essay examines narratives that emerge in cases of forced and
voluntary adolescent marriage. These narratives suggest that
behavior that we might find troubling is more often causally
attributed to a group-defined culture when the actor is perceived to
"have" culture. Because we tend to perceive white Americans as
"people without culture," when white people engage in certain
practices we do not associate their behavior with a racialized
conception of culture, but rather construct other, non-cultural
explanations. The result is an exaggerated perception of ethnic
difference that equates it with moral difference from "us."
In this Essay, I examine discursive representations -the narratives
* © 2000 Leti Volpp. Assistant Professor, American University, Washington College of
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that underlie public perception, legal discourse, and scholarly
writings. I interrogate the way in which identity casts certain
individuals outside the boundaries of our social body. Differentiation
can occur through numerous identity-based distinctions-class and
sexuality, for example. Here my focus is on race and immigrant
status.
This Essay compares narratives in which two groups of adolescent
women marry older men: girls who are white, and girls who are
immigrants of color. In Part I, an examination of two cases of
voluntary marriage reveals that when the actors involved are
immigrants of color, we label behavior that we consider problematic
as "cultural," and understand this term to mark racial or ethnic
identity. Thus, we consider early marriage by a Mexican immigrant
to reflect "Mexican culture." In contrast, when a white person
commits a similar act, we view it as an isolated instance of aberrant
behavior, and not as reflective of a racialized culture. Under this
schema, white people are individual actors; people of color are
members of groups. This Part examines why we equate race and
culture and selectively blame culture for bad behavior.
Part II contrasts two cases of forced marriage to examine how the
equation of race and culture in these cases relates to the interplay of
nationalism, gender, and sexuality. This is significant because the
terrain on which we articulate and understand racialized difference is
frequently that of gendered treatment. The two cases of forced
marriage show that prohibited behavior -parental coercion of a
daughter's marriage-is conceptualized as a threat to "American"
values when the perpetrator is an Iraqi immigrant, but not when the
perpetrator is white. National identities, expressed here in the form
of "American values," often coalesce around women's bodies and
incorporate racial judgments. Thus, we project problematic behavior
beyond the borders of the idealized nation by locating bad behavior
on the bodies of racialized immigrant subjects.
Finally, Part III examines the consequences of selectively blaming
culture by asking what we miss when we misread in this fashion.
Selectively blaming culture leads to the misapprehension that certain
immigrant cultures are fundamentally different from "our" culture.
Ethnic difference is equated with moral difference, with which we
must struggle in a multicultural state. Specifically, commentators
depict the sex-subordinating practices of certain immigrants as
creating an irreconcilable tension between the values of feminism
and multiculturalism. The presumed existence of this conflict leads
to policy proposals and theoretical conclusions that exaggerate
differences between "us" and "them." Such misreadings prevent us
from seeing, understanding, and struggling against specific relations
[Vol. 12:89
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of power-both within "other" cultures and our own.
I. VOLUNTARY MARRIAGE
A. Tina Akers and Wayne Compton
In September 1998, the front page of the Washington Post
announced, "Girl, 13, Marries into Controversy."' Tina Akers, a
thirteen-year-old, had married twenty-nine-year-old Wayne
Compton in Maryland.2 After they had dated for a few months, Tina
became pregnant; she bore their son three weeks after the wedding.'
At the time, Maryland law provided no minimum legal age of
marriage: Anyone younger than sixteen with parental consent and
proof of pregnancy could be legally married.' Critics called for
Wayne Compton to be investigated for sexual assault, Tina's parents
to be investigated for child abuse, and state lawmakers to outlaw
such unions To date, Wayne Compton has not been prosecuted,6
but in April 1999, Maryland legislators passed a bill raising the age of
consent for minors to marry.7 While the original bill introduced
would have prohibited marriage for anyone younger than sixteen,
legislators' concerns that the bill would result in more births out of
wedlock led to a final version allowing fifteen-year-old girls to get
married if they are both pregnant and have parental consent.8
Nowhere in the sound and fury over the Akers/Compton case was
there any reference to their marriage as a cultural phenomenon.9
1. Amy Argetsinger, Girl, 13, Marries Into Controversy: Arundel Says It's Legal, But
Critics Say It's Child Abuse, WASH. POST, Sept. 29, 1998, at Al.
2. See id.
3. See id. The baby subsequently died in his sleep. An autopsy gave the cause as sudden
infant death syndrome, but police launched an investigation. See Amy Argetsinger, Assembly
Votes to Ban Some Teen Marriages, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 1999, at C4.
4. See MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 2-301 (1991).
5. See Argetsinger, supra note 1, at A10; Editorial, Assembly's Home Stretch, BALT. SUN,
Mar. 22, 1999, at 8A (describing "shocking news" of Akers-Compton marriage and opining
that it is against social norms for a 13-year-old to marry and have children).
6. Prosecutors declined, noting that Compton and her family have not filed a complaint
nor shown any willingness to testify against him. See Argetsinger, supra note 3, at C4.
7. See H.B. 388, 413th Leg. (Md. 1999) (amending MD. CODE ANN., FAMILY LAW § 2-301
to absolutely prohibit an individual under age 15 from marrying, to require an individual
between ages 15 and 16 to have parental consent and proof of pregnancy, and to require 16-
and 17-year-olds to have either parental consent or proof of pregnancy); see also Close to
Home, Unhappily Ever After in Maryland, WASH. POST, Apr. 4, 1999, at B8 (excerpted
testimony on House Bill 388 of the clerk of the Anne Arundel Circuit Court before the
Maryland House Judiciary Committee).
8. See Argetsinger, supra note 3, at C4. The fact that 15-year-olds can still marry puts the
bill in conflict with the state's sexual offense laws. See id.; see also MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, §
464B (1999).
9. In addition to sources already cited, see Mary Allen, Probe Goes on in Case of Married
Mother, 13, CAPITAL, Sept. 30, 1998, at Al; Political Notes: 13-Year-Old Girl's Marriage to Be
Discussed on Radio, CAPITAL, Oct. 15, 1998, at A8.
2000]
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While the two were both white, no one considered this marriage to
be a moment that defined white American culture. Instead, the
media, the public, law enforcement, and lawmakers understood the
marriage as an example of aberrant behavior, which they variously
characterized as child abuse, sexual perversion, and corruption of a
minor.
B. Adela Quintana and Pedro Sotelo
In contrast, when fourteen-year-old Adela Quintana and twenty-
two-year-old Pedro Sotelo had a child in Texas, reporters described
the case as "exposing a cultural divide,"" as demonstrating "a clash
between two different cultures,"" and as engendering "public
discussion about how to bridge cultural chasms."' 3 In January 1996,
police and child welfare officials in Houston, Texas, launched a
massive search to locate Quintana, a pregnant runaway then
believed to be ten years old, and her boyfriend. 4 Quintana, an
undocumented immigrant, had first come to the state's attention
when she attempted to apply for welfare by using a fraudulent birth
certificate. 5 After Child Protective Services placed Quintana in an
emergency shelter for abused children and the District Attorney
charged Sotelo with aggravated sexual assault of a child, the couple
fled. 6 When authorities captured them, they put Sotelo in a
maximum security facility and placed Quintana in a foster home. The
charges against Sotelo were dropped after a family court judge ruled
that the couple had a valid common-law marriage under Texas law.
In Texas, children younger than fourteen cannot consent to sexual
intercourse; 8 however, the statutory rape law defines a child as "a
person younger than 17 years of age who is not the spouse of the
actor." 9 Although for formal marriage in Texas both bride and
10. See Argetsinger, supra note 1, at A13.
11. Sandra Sanchez, In Texas, Worlds Collide: Expectant Couple Caught in Clash of Two
Cultures, USA TODAY, Jan. 29, 1996, at 1D.
12. Id.
13. Syd Kearney, Heroes and Heartaches: Putting 1996 in Perspective, Hous. CHRON., Jan.
2, 1997, at 5.
14. See generally Nina Perales, Cultural Stereotype and the Legal Response to Pregnant
Teens, in MOTHER TROUBLES: RETHINKING CONTEMPORARY MATERNAL DILEMMAS 81
(Julia E. Hanigsberg & Sarah Ruddick eds., 1999). Perales's essay is an excellent and incisive
critique of assumptions about pregnant Latina teenagers.
15. The birth certificate identified her as 10-year-old Cindy Garcia. See Jo Ann Zuniga,
Deportation Hearing for Young Couple Could Be Trying for Judge, Hous. CHRON., Mar. 28,
1997, at 30.
16. See Perales, supra note 14, at 82.
17. See id. at 85-86.
18. See May v. State, 903 S.W.2d 792, 794 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995).
19. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.011(c)(1) to (2) (West 1997).
[Vol. 12:89
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groom must be at least eighteen," Quintana's age was no bar to the
common-law marriage; at the time, the state had established no
minimum age of consent to common-law marriage.2
Sotelo's civil attorney described Quintana as a physically mature
"buxom lass. '22 She stated that, in rural Mexico, "once a girl hits
puberty she is fair game."'23 Sotelo's criminal attorney declared that
the case "was a cultural collision" and that his client was not guilty of
statutory rape because he was following the customs of his rural
village in Mexico 4.2  The press also depicted the case as a clash of
American and Mexican cultures. Dateline NBC sent a reporter to
Mexico to interview people in Sotelo's home village about their
awareness of early marriage. The program referred to Sotelo as "an
innocent player in a big cultural misunderstanding. 25
In her critique of the Quintana/Sotelo case, Nina Perales points
out that it was Texas culture, embodied in statute, rather than
Mexican culture, that resolved the dispute. Marriage at a young age
is hardly an anomaly in Texas: Annually an average of 470 girls
fourteen and younger marry there. 6 In fact, Mexican law actually
provides stricter age requirements for marriage than Texas law.27
Nevertheless, this case was understood as a definitional moment of
Mexican culture.
C. Contrasting Narratives
What explains the different narratives that emerged from these
20. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.101 (West 1997). In Texas, one can marry at 14 with the
consent of a parent, see id. § 2.102, or at 13 with a court order, see id. § 2.003.
21. See id. § 2.402(c). Following this case, a bill was filed to eliminate common-law
marriage as a defense to statutory rape. Bill Bars Common-Law Marriage as Rape Defense,
Hous. CHRON., Feb. 4, 1997, at 17. The bill was enacted in 1997. See 1997 Tex. Sess. Law Serv.
1362 (West) (as codified at TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 1999)) (amending the law to
exclude individuals under the age of 18 from common-law marriages).
22. Perales, supra note 14, at 87.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 83.
25. The Dateline NBC program (February 1996) is described in Perales, supra note 14, at
84.
26. See Nicole Koch, Letting Young Girls Marry Gets Another Look in Utah: Opponents
Fear the Weddings Are Forced on Child Brides, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 27, 1998, at
10A.
27. I am indebted to Iqbal Gulati for suggesting this point. In Mexico, the age requirement
for formal marriage is 18. With parental consent, or, if parents are unavailable, with the
consent of grandparents, one can marry at 16 if male, 14 if female. See CODIGO CIVIL PARA EL
DISrRrO FEDERAL arts. 148-49 (Mex.) (1996 WL 920101-2), translated in MEXICAN CIVIL
AND COMMERCIAL CODES arts. 148-49 (1996 WL 915520-1) (describing the law in Mexico
City). In the state of Guerrero, the home state of Pedro Sotelo, the minimum age at marriage is
the same as in Mexico City. See CODIGO CIVIL GUERRERO art. 412; see also Navegador
Juridico Internacional, InfoJUS (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.juridicas.unam.mx>. Many
thanks to Carolina Sevilla for her assistance in researching the Mexican law.
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two cases? Examining the way culture is conceptualized and linked
with race provides an explanation. We sometimes assume culture to
be static and insular, a fixed property of groups rather than an entity
constantly created through relationships. This assumption is made
much more frequently for outsider communities such as communities
of color. Culture, for communities of color, is transformed into what
Paul Gilroy calls a "pseudo-biological property of communal life.
28
Under such a paradigm, culture for communities of color is a fixed,
monolithic essence that directs the actions of community members.
Racialized culture thus becomes an essence that is transmitted in an
unchanging form from one generation to the next. 9 We can contrast
this racialized culture to culture that is considered to be
"hegemonic"-the culture established as the norm?0  Hegemonic
culture is either experienced as invisible31 or is characterized by
hybridity, fluidity, and complexity. 2 The sophistication with which
28. As Gilroy writes:
Culture is conceived along ethnically absolute lines, not as something intrinsically fluid,
changing, unstable and dynamic, but as a fixed property of social groups rather than a
relational field in which they encounter one another and live out social, historical
relationships. When culture is brought into contact with "race" it is transformed into a
pseudo-biological property of communal life.
PAUL GILROY, SMALL ACTS: THOUGHTS ON THE POLITICS OF BLACK CULTURES 24 (1993).
29. Lisa Lowe makes the helpful suggestion that we recognize "the ways in which [culture]
is imagined, practiced, and continued.... [Culture] is worked out as much 'horizontally'
among communities as it is transmitted 'vertically' in unchanging forms from one generation to
the next." LISA LOWE, IMMIGRANT ACTS: ON ASIAN AMERICAN CULTURAL POLITICS 64
(1996).
30. Hegemonic culture is characterized less by what it is than by what it is not: raceless,
classless culture that could not be attributed to any particular "subculture" of American
society. What is considered to be hegemonic culture, the culture of the norm, is a flexible
concept that constricts and expands in different contexts, depending upon who "we" are
considered to be.
31. Generally, "white" culture is not marked or noted, an absence connected to the
invisibility of whiteness as a race. On whiteness, see generally GEORGE LIPSITZ, THE
POSSESSIVE INVESTMENT IN WHITENESS: How WHITE PEOPLE PROFIT FROM IDENTITY
POLITICS (1998); IAN F. HANEY L6PEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF
RACE (1996); DAVID ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS: ESSAYS ON
RACE, POLITICS, AND WORKING CLASS IDENTITY (1994).
32. The work of anthropologists such as James Clifford, George Marcus, and Renato
Rosaldo has been foundational in developing a critical anthropology that subjects our own
culture to the same level of scrutiny to which anthropologists had traditionally only subjected
"other" cultures. See generally JAMES CLIFFORD, THE PREDICAMENT OF CULTURE:
TWENTIETH-CENTURY ETHNOGRAPHY, LITERATURE, AND ART (1988); WRITING CULTURE:
THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY (James Clifford & George E. Marcus eds.,
1986); RENATO ROSALDO, CULTURE AND TRUTH: THE REMAKING OF SOCIAL ANALYSIS
(1993).
More recently, in the legal literature, norms theorists have begun to examine the way in
which our society is shaped by extra-legal norms. This work could be considered a helpful step
toward examining our behavior, although it is limited by its account of the development and
entrenchment of norms solely in rational choice terms. For a discussion of why engaging in the
insights of anthropology and sociology would be profitable for norms theory, see Mark
Tushnet, "Everything Old Is New Again": Early Reflections on the "New Chicago School," 1998
WiS. L. REv. 579.
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we understand hegemonic culture to be complicated and
contradictory-something with which we actively negotiate-is
unmatched by an equally complicated understanding of outsider
cultures.
These visions of culture influence our perceptions of individual
acts. For communities of color, a specific individual act is assumed to
be the product of a group identity and further, is used to define the
group. Thus, people perceive Adela Quintana's early sexuality and
marriage to be the product of Mexican identity and definitive of
Mexican identity.33 In contrast, the media does not present early
sexuality and marriage by Tina Compton as the product of white
identity, and thus her case does not perpetuate any perception that
teen marriage is a phenomenon of "white culture."
This cultural identification may change, though, if her behavior is
associated with a white identity that is differentiated from the
"norm" by her class position. While narratives of the case did not
explicitly highlight the couple's working-class white identity, class
was a subtext in the media's description of Tina and Wayne
Compton. ' Many of the behaviors attributed to people of color are
similarly ascribed to working-class whites, e.g., early marriage and
excessive promiscuity.35 Assumptions about class frequently operate
to thrust working-class whites out of the presumptive normalcy of
''our" culture.
However, in this case teen marriage was only implicitly presented
as a phenomenon associated with class, and not explicitly named as
such. Instead, Tina Akers and Wayne Compton were configured,
despite their working-class identity, to be a part of "us." So long as
Tina Compton belonged to "our culture," her behavior was not
33. The practices of the Orange County Social Services Agency between 1994 and 1996
demonstrated the assumption that early sexuality and marriage are part of Latino/a or Mexican
culture: The agency encouraged approximately 15 pregnant adolescent girls under its
protection to marry or live with the men who fathered their children. All but one of the girls
were Latina. Some were as young as 13. See Vincent J. Schodolski, Making a Family, But at a
Cost? Pregnant Teens Pushed to Marry Adult Lovers, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1996, at 1. The
Orange County Agency director had believed for a period that the age of consent to marriage
in Mexico was 12. See Matt Lait, Agency Helps Some Girls Wed Men Who Impregnated Them,
L.A. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1996, at Al. While some agency social workers said that the arrangements
reflected the "cultural" mores of Mexico, others charged in internal memos that the agency's
approach smacked of racism. See Matt Lait, O.C. Agency Report Urges Change in Teen
Wedding Policy, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1996, at Al. See also Perales, supra note 14, at 88-89.
34. The Washington Post described a "pickup truck and fish tank" sitting in the front yard
of her mother's house in "a dusty Annapolis suburb," and the reporter noted that she had
dropped out of seventh grade the previous spring; her husband was described as an
"unemployed roofer" who dropped out of school in the eleventh grade. Argetsinger, supra
note 1, at Al.
35. For a description of how working-class whites were historically assumed to be sexually
promiscuous, see Jane E. Larson, "Even a Worm Will Turn at Last": Rape Reform in Late
Nineteenth-Century America, 9 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 30 (1997).
200]
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perceived to reflect norms associated with race. Instead, media
accounts explained her behavior as reflecting trends in a national,
presumptively raceless culture,' or ascribed her actions to a lack of
rationality. In the latter construction, Tina Compton and her
husband are personally dysfunctional, "perverse," and "irrespon-
sible."37 They are individual actors whose behavior is not the product
of a group identity. Their behavior, in this view, does not reflect an
ethnic or racial identity, nor is it used to define "whiteness."
We do not perceive adolescent marriage to be a property of
whiteness, nor to be a classless, white cultural norm. Behavior that
causes discomfort-that we consider "bad"-is conceptualized only
as culturally canonical for cultures assumed to lag behind the United
States. This tendency to submerge only certain groups into the forces
of culture is linked to the assumption that the behavior of devalued
and less powerful groups is somehow more culturally determined-
that they behave in certain ways and make particular choices
because they follow cultural dictates."
Cultures that are thought to lag behind are often differentiated
from the hegemonic culture by race. When people of color are
assumed to "lag" because they are governed by cultural dictates,
their cultural values stand in stark contrast to reason, supposedly a
characteristic of the West. The notion that non-Western people are
governed by culture suggests they have a limited capacity for agency,
will, or rational thought.39
The assumption that people of color are governed by cultural
dictates is not only dehumanizing, it is also depoliticizing because
such thinking often leads us to neglect the power of "noncultural"
36. See, e.g., Argetsinger, supra note 1, at Al (describing a shift in attitudes toward teen
marriage, connected to industrialization and child labor laws, that pushed young people off
farms and into high schools, and noting that by 1990 only 3.7% of first-time brides were
younger than 18, down from 13% in 1970).
37. See id. at Al, A10 (describing perspectives that marriage was sexually abusive,
predatory, and pedophiliac).
38. Rosaldo describes the inverse relationship between power and possession of "cultural"
traits:
In "our" own eyes, "we" appear to be "people without culture" .... [Flull citizenship
and cultural visibility appear to be inversely related.... [Alnalysts rarely allow the ratio
of class and culture to include power. Thus they conceal the ratio's darker side: the more
power one has, the less culture one enjoys, and the more culture one has, the less power
one wields.
ROSALDO, supra note 32, at 198,202 (1993).
39. For a description of how this operates in the Western perception of China, see Teemu
Ruskola, Taking Chinese Law Seriously: Towards a Critical Theory of Comparative Law 52
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing the following "ingredients" of a
noxious stew that is still served today as "China": "China is changeless, the West progressive[;]
the Chinese are passive, Westerners active[;] the Chinese are lemmings, Westerners
individuals[;] the Chinese state is despotic, the Western state democratic[;] the Chinese are
irrational, Westerners rational[;] the Chinese are ruled by morality, Westerners by law").
[Vol. 12:89
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forces in shaping reality.' Cultural explanations for a particular
problematic situation attribute responsibility to a static and insular
"culture," and not, for example, to government policies. Take the
idea that there exists in the United States a racialized underclass
submerged in a "culture of poverty."'" Suggesting that a pathological
and dysfunctional "culture" is to blame for poverty obscures the role
of, for example, state-sponsored segregation and private
discrimination in creating poverty. Similarly, Lino Graglia has
suggested that the primary explanation for lower test scores of
Blacks and Hispanics is their membership in cultures that neither
encourage achievement nor condemn academic failure.42 Pointing the
finger at culture in this way excludes the role of gross and systemic
disparities in school funding and resources.43
The idea that nonwhites are more culturally determined can be
traced to historical antecedents in colonialist and imperialist
discourse. This discourse contrasted tradition and modernity in the
service of justifying the conquest and subjugation of the colonized."
40. For example, explaining gender subordination as "cultural" may erase linkages of this
subordination with the denial of economic and political agency due to global inequalities, new
articulations of patriarchies in specific regions, the legacies of colonization, or the flows of
transnational capital. See Inderpal Grewal & Caren Kaplan, Warrior Marks: Global
Womanism's Neo-Colonial Discourse in a Multicultural Context, 39 CAMERA OBSCURA 5, 14-
15 (1996).
41. See DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION
(1965); CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980, at 145-
91 (1984) (arguing that post-1960 social welfare policies have encouraged self-destructive
behavior among blacks and poor people). For a critique of the "culture of poverty" thesis, see
ROBIN D.G. KELLEY, YO' MAMA'S DISFUNKTIONAL!: FIGHTING THE CULTURE WARS IN
URBAN AMERICA (1997) (arguing that social scientists have contributed to a construction of
the ghetto as a reservoir of pathologies and bad cultural values).
42. Professor Graglia's remarks spawned a national controversy. As the National Law
Journal described:
[Professor Graglia] was asked if lower test scores of blacks and Mexican-Americans are
caused by genetic or cultural differences. "Blacks and Mexican-Americans are not
academically competitive with whites in selective institutions," he replied. "It is the result
primarily of cultural effects. They have a culture that seems not to encourage
achievement. Failure is not looked upon with disgrace." He latdr said he didn't see any
benefit in mixing white children with "lower classes" because they "perform less well in
school and tend towards greater violent behavior."
Rights, Wrongs, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 29, 1997, at A20. Graglia asserted afterwards that he had
misspoken, and attributed the performance gap instead to the average amount of time spent in
school or doing school work. He also said that "his own cultural background-Sicilian-had
similar 'cultural' deficiencies" and that he "should have kept his mouth shut." Id.
43. See, e.g., Elvia R. Arriola, Difference, Solidarity and Law: Building Latinalo
Communities Through LatCrit Theory, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REv. 1, 65 (1998) (describing
research indicating that disparities in test scores between minorities and white students is
dependent on the demographics of the school as a "white" or "minority" school and related
policies of placing the least experienced and worst paid teachers at "minority" schools).
44. See, e.g., Ruskola, supra note 39, at 44 (quoting GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 103, 142 (J. Sibree trans., Dover Public. 1956) (1837)) ("The
history of the world travels from East to West, for Europe is absolutely the end of History,
Asia the beginning.... It is the necessary fate of Asiatic empires to be subjected to
Europeans.").
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Colonialism associated tradition with colonized peoples, ancient
ritual, despotism, and barbarity, while connecting modernity to
Western progress, democracy, and enlightenment.4" According to the
West, culture-not the high culture of opera, but the culture of daily
activities, quotidian practices and rites-did not rule the lives of the
rational thinkers of the West as it did those who were governed by
tradition, folk ways, and tribal affiliations. Because the association of
culture with tradition continues to linger, people tend to forget that
culture undergoes constant transformation. A sophisticated and
accurate understanding of culture requires us to recognize its
fluidity. We are all agents who define our culture and identity, not
solely marionettes positioned and directed by our culture.' At the
same time, we must recognize that our society tends more readily to
identify those who deviate from the hegemonic norm, who are
perceived to inhabit outsider communities, to inherit culture that we
assume to be monolithic, fixed, and dysfunctional.47
Of course, "our" hegemonic culture is also characterized by
dysfunction. We recently came to a long-overdue realization that
rates of gun-related violence are completely out of control in the
United States. The spate of school shootings by white, middle-class
children has led to anguished discussions about what is "wrong" with
"our" culture.4" These incidents have led to a recognition that either
our culture is deeply flawed or its integrity is threatened by the
45. See generally CULTURES OF UNITED STATES IMPERIALISM (Amy Kaplan & Donald E.
Pease eds., 1993); EDWARD W. SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993); EDWARD W. SAID,
ORIENTALISM (1978). The construction of this discourse, which Said described as
"Orientalism," was a complex process. In presenting this simple, bifurcated description, I do
not intend to suggest that this was not a hybrid, contradictory process that varied across time
and space. For a study of the heterogeneity of Orientalism, see generally LISA LOWE,
CRITICAL TERRAINS: FRENCH-AND BRITISH ORIENTALISMS (1991).
46. See Stuart Hall, Cultural Identity and Diaspora, in IDENTITY, COMMUNITY, CULTURE,
DIFFERENCE 222, 225 (Jonathan Rutherford ed., 1990).
47. See KELLEY, supra note 41, at 22 (critiquing the assumption that there is one
identifiable ghetto culture, and asserting that this assumption can be partly attributed to
ethnographers' training in the West). Kelley notes that James Clifford has observed that
anthropologists studying non-Western societies are compelled to describe the communities
they study not only as completely foreign to their own, but also as possessing an identifiable,
homogenous culture. Kelley argues that the same holds true for interpretations of black urban
America, since ethnographers can argue that inner city residents, as a "foreign" culture, do not
share "mainstream" values. Their behavior is understood as shaped by unique cultural
"norms," rather than reflecting individual responses to specific circumstances. See id. at 22-23.
48. We even have a new noun, "school shooters." The columnist Leonard Pitts noted the
irony in the life of one shooting victim, Richard Peek. The first time Peek was shot, in a school
shooting by Kipland Kinkel, "you heard all about it." After Peek was shot by Kinkel, Peek said
that if he could, he would "make it harder for kids to get guns." The second time Peek was
shot, he was killed by his 17-year-old brother in a hunting accident. Pitts asserts that we have
learned to live with shootings that constitute the mundane face of American gun violence. In
1997, a mindboggling 10,369 people were murdered by firearms in the United States. See
Leonard Pitts, Shooting Reflects the Real Gun Crisis, YORK DAILY REC. (Penn.), Oct. 17, 1999,
at 2.
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Internet, video games, access to guns, Satanic music, and
irresponsible parents. Nonetheless, it is important to note that if the
school shooters had not been middle-class and white, a different
discourse would have emerged. Rather than hand-wringing about
"our" culture, there would have been condemnation of "their"
culture. Imagine, for example, that the shootings at Columbine High
School had been committed by black students.49 What narrative
would have been told? There would have been less soul-searching
about our nation's cultural values and what is wrong with "us."
Instead, there would have been a discourse that conceptualized the
violence as typifying what is wrong with "them."5 The school
shootings raise the question of why only certain groups are
considered to constitute our social body, so that their achievements
are our own, and their pathologies our failures.51
Considering some groups to be separate from our social body is a
form of epistemic violence. Gayatri Spivak describes how the
ideologies of colonialism and imperialism define the Other through
depictions of the colonialized as exotic, primitive anthropological
objects. 2 Institutional violence often accompanies this epistemic
violence.53 The experiences of Sotelo and Quintana following the
conclusion of criminal proceedings reflect both forms of violence,
since their "illegal" status differentiated them from "those who
belong." Despite the fact that their child, Bryant, was born legally
blind, in 1998 an immigration judge ordered Sotelo's deportation
because he failed to establish seven years of continuous residency in
the United States?'
49. Orlando Patterson argues that there is a disturbing double standard in how we label
deviant behavior. He writes: "If the terrorist act of white, middle-class teenagers creates an
orgy of national soul-searching, then surely the next time a heinous crime is committed by
underclass African-American or Latino kids, we should engage in the same kind of national
self-examination." Orlando Patterson, What If the Killers Had Been Black?, PLAIN DEALER
(Cleveland), May 4, 1999, at 9B.
50. See Courtland Milloy, A Look at Tragedy in Black, White, WASH. POST, May 2, 1999,
at Cl. Milloy writes of hearing comments like "I'm so glad those killers weren't black. You
know we'd all be in trouble if they were." He posits that if the killers in Columbine had been
black, their parents would have been hauled off in handcuffs in front of television cameras, and
everybody who knew them would be under suspicion. He notes that the shooters were referred
to as members of a "clique," not a gang, and that one reporter referred to one of the killers as
"a gentleman who drove a BMW," signifying an identification with the killers and a reluctance
to demonize them as blacks would have been. Id. I am indebted to Mark Niles for calling my
attention to this op-ed piece.
51. I borrow this phrasing from Orlando Patterson, see supra note 49, at 9B.
52. See Gayatri C. Spivak, Can the Subaltern Speak?, in MARXISM AND THE
INTERPRETATION OF CULTURE 271, 281 (Cary Nelson & Lawrence Grossberg eds., 1988).
53. As Anne McClintock points out, epistemic violence is all too often supported by the
planned institutional violence of armies, law courts, prisons, and state machinery. See ANNE
MCCLINTOCK, IMPERIAL LEATHER: RACE, GENDER AND SEXUALITY IN THE COLONIAL
CONTEST 16 (1993)(discussing this phenomenon in the colonial context).
54. At the time of Sotelo's application, the continuous residency requirement was seven
20001
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II. FORCED MARRIAGE
A. The Kingston Case
A second pair of contrasting cases echoes these findings and yields
additional observations. In May 1998, a sixteen-year-old in Utah,
forced by her father to marry her thirty-two-year-old uncle as his
fifteenth wife, called 911 for help." The uncle, David Kingston, was
charged with incest and sexual conduct with a minor, both third-
degree felonies,56 and received a ten-year jail sentence. Her father,
John Daniel Kingston, the leader of a large polygamist clan, pled
guilty to felony child abuse for beating her into unconsciousness
when she tried to run away. In Utah-as in Texas-parental
consent or a court order allow marriage at an age younger than
eighteen. 9 Until May 1999, marriages were only prohibited when the
male or female was under fourteen years of age.' Since that time, the
age of consent has been raised to sixteen, but fifteen-year-olds may
still marry with parental consent and authorization from a judge.61
Before the law was amended, every year about 800 girls aged
fourteen through seventeen were reported to marry in Utah.62
Rumors of coerced arranged marriages and children sold by their
parents had led to repeated attempts to enact legislation that would
outlaw marriages of fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds. A bill was
withdrawn in 1997 under pressure from legislators who believed
child marriage prevents teen promiscuity.63  Legislators also
years. This is no longer the case, thanks to the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act ("IIRAIRA"). See 8 U.S.C. § 1254, amended by 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b)
(increasing the requirement of seven years of continuous residency for suspension of
deportation to ten years under what is now called cancellation of removal, see INA §
240A(b)). IIRAIRA also amended the statute to mandate that any departure from the United
States in excess of 90 days or any departure in the aggregate exceeding 180 days will preclude a
finding of continuous physical presence. See INA § 240A(d)(2). Quintana and their child were
allowed to stay pending her application for change of immigration status. See Jo Ann Zuniga,
Mom, Blind Child May Stay in Houston, Judge Orders Immigrant Father to Be Deported,
Hous. CHRON., May 6,1997, at 17.
55. See Stephen Hunt, Kingston Ordered to Trial, SALT LAKE TRIB., Dec. 11, 1998, at D1.
56. See Utah Gets Rare Chance to Prosecute Polygamist, COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Aug. 6,
1998, at A7.
57. See Julie Cart, Incest Trial Sheds Light on Polygamy in Utah, L.A. TIMES, June 4, 1999,
at A3; Hannah Wolfson, Alleged Polygamist Gets Up to Ten Years for Having Sex with His
Niece, AP, July 9,1999, available in 1999 WL 17822686.
58. See Wolfson, supra note 57. He was sentenced to 28 weeks in jail, ordered to pay $2,700
in fines and an unspecified amount in restitution, and to complete an anger-management
program. He had faced up to five years in prison. See Polygamous Leader Sentenced to 28
Weeks in Jail for Whipping, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., June 30, 1999, at 13A.
59. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-9 (1953 & Supp. 1999).
60. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-9 (1953 & Supp. 1998) (repealed in 1999).
61. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-9 (1953 & Supp. 1999).
62. See Koch, supra note 26, at 10A.
63. See Outrage of the Month, Child Brides-In Utah (visited Nov. 5, 1998)
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expressed concern that such legislation would be unfairly aimed at
the state's polygamists.' While the practice of plural marriage was
renounced by the Mormon Church in 1890, it has persisted among
religious splinter groups65 and has not been prosecuted by the state
for several decades.' The Governor of Utah, a descendent of
polygamists, refused to condemn polygamy at a news conference,
suggesting that it may be protected as a religious freedom.67 His
comments were quickly condemned by an organization of women
who have abandoned polygamous relationships. They denounce the
practice as abusive toward women and children, both inherently and
as it is practiced.' Subsequently, the Women's Religious Liberties
Union (WRLU) was founded by a woman in a polygamous
relationship who asserted that polygamy appropriately channels
men's sexuality. The WRLU called for a repeal of the state law
banning plural marriage.69
The months after the sixteen-year-old's phone call led to a "raft of
questions" about "Utah's dirty little secret."'7 Allegations included
evidence of large-scale welfare fraud by women in plural marriages
claiming to be single mothers, rampant incest and child abuse, and
girls as young as ten forced into arranged marriages. The media
<http://www.feminist.com/outrag7.htm>.
64. See Mike Carter, Legislator Struggles to Stop Utah's Pre-16 Marriages, OREGONIAN,
Feb. 8, 1998, at A24.
65. An estimated 20,000 to 100,000 people live in polygamous families, more than when
plural marriage was official Mormon doctrine, and this population appears to be growing. See
Vince Beiser, The Perils of Polygamy, MACLEAN'S, July 26, 1999, at 32.
66. See R. Michael Otto, "Wait 'Til Your Mothers Get Home," Assessing the Rights of
Polygamists as Custodial and Adoptive Parents, 1991 UTAH L. REv. 881, 883 (noting that the
last polygamy prosecution in the U.S. took place in 1965); John Hiscock, Girl's Incest Case
Evidence Set to Lift Lid on Mormon Polygamy, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 6, 1998, at
14 (noting that Kingston case would be the first prosecution for polygamy in 45 years).
However, Kingston was not ultimately prosecuted for polygamy.
67. See Mike Carter, Child Abuse Case Raises Polygamy Questions in Utah, STATE J.-REG.
(Springfield, Ill.), Aug. 3, 1998, at 14.
68. See id. Tapestry of Polygamy was founded by six women who left plural marriages.
They focus on allegations of sexual abuse, pedophilia, and incest. One of the founders points to
the polygamous roots of many members of the state's power structure. "They all have this
romantic view of how their grandfathers practiced it. But this is not grandpa's polygamy. As
near as I can tell, Brigham Young was not a pedophile." Timothy Egan, The Persistence of
Polygamy, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1999 (Magazine), at 51-53.
69. See James Langton, Mormon Women Break Silence to Praise the Joys of Polygamy,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Aug. 9, 1998, at 26. The founder of the group, Mary Potter,
says that "[in polygamy, men are properly channeled." Egan, supra note 68, at 54. She and
other supporters of polygamy point to recent studies that maintain that men are evolutionarily
wired for multiple sex partners. See id. An anthropologist, Janet Bennion, who has written
about one of the largest polygamous clans, says she believes polygamy can offer a sense of
security and a kind of sisterhood to modem women, while she concedes there have been
incidents of sexual abuse, marrying of relatives, and ostracizing of older, less attractive wives
within the clans. See id.
70. Julie Cart, Tales of Abuse, Incest Frame "Utah's Dirty Little Secret," L.A. TIMES, Aug.
15, 1998, at Al.
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described the polygamists as a community of people who live as
"societal ciphers," with no birth certificates or driver's licenses, who
do not pay taxes or vote."1
There has been a discourse of condemnation surrounding both the
Kingston case and polygamous Mormon splinter groups more
generally.' Historically, Mormons have been subjected to a
campaign against polygamy couched in terms of national morality
and even national survival,73 rhetoric not unlike that directed against
communities of color today. But the current discourse does not
include accusations that Mormons, with their failure to assimilate,
their failure to Americanize, threaten longstanding American
values.74 No one asserts that statewide acceptance of these diverse
cultural practices is symptomatic of multiculturalism run amok. Nor
does anyone characterize this as a collision between multiculturalism
and feminism.75
71. See id.
72. State Senator Scott Howell, the leader of the Democratic legislative minority in Utah,
who introduced legislation targeting polygamy, stated: "Here, we've got all the world coming
to town for the Olympics. Do we really want to be known as the place where we let old men
marry little girls?" Egan, supra note 68, at 55.
73. As Sarah Barringer Gordon describes, by 1890, when the church capitulated to
demands that it abandon polygamy, the federal government had directed much energy toward
enacting and enforcing legislation in Utah. Such legislation included the criminal punishment
of polygamists, the revocation of the vote for all who could not swear they did not live in a
polygamous relationship, and the forfeiture of all but $50,000 of church property. Polygamy
was assumed to be based on uncontrolled male sensuality and to threaten all that was pure in
monogamous domesticity. See Sarah Barringer Gordon, "Our National Hearthstone": Anti-
Polygamy Fiction and the Campaign Against Moral Diversity in Antebellum America, 8 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 295, 306-07, 327-28 (1996). New York Times reporter Timothy Egan notes that
from the founding of the church in 1830, Mormons have been persecuted, and that their fear of
outsiders is integral to their religious identity. See Egan, supra note 68, at 54.
74. See, e.g., Egan, supra note 68, at 50; Bruce Frankel, Lifting the Veil, PEOPLE, June 21,
1999, at 125.
75. In writing about the Kingston case, Katha Pollitt argues that the ACLU ought to
abandon its opposition to laws against polygamy. The ACLU justifies its policy on the basis of
religious freedom, freedom of expression, and privacy. Pollitt, on the other hand, argues that
polygamy is gender-subordinating in our current universe, whereas it might not be
subordinating in a world where the age of consent were, say, 30, where teenage girls had real
autonomy, where all women were well-educated and able to support themselves and their
children, and where people were less isolated and less easily trapped. When Pollitt prodded the
ACLU to consider how polygamy is different from "religious or cultural defenses of child
abuse, domestic violence or female genital mutilation," she was told that "violence is
different." Katha Pollitt, Polymaritally Perverse, THE NATION, Oct. 4, 1999, at 10. While Pollitt
is pushing in the direction I want to go, toward recognizing that we tend to respond
inconsistently to gender-subordinating behavior, I am not sure if she would endorse my
assertion that our divergent responses correlate with the actor's identity. I also note that the
examples she presents as the fixed practices the ACLU must really condemn-religious or
cultural defenses of child abuse, domestic violence, or female genital mutilation-constitute
the paradigmatic stereotype of sexism by immigrants that is thought to characterize gendered
"multicultural" difference from "us."
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B. The AI-Saidy Case
In contrast, when two sisters, thirteen and fourteen, were forced by
their Iraqi immigrant father in 1996 to marry twenty-eight- and
thirty-four-year-old men in Nebraska, critics deemed the case an
illustration of "the proper limits of multiculturalism."76 After
spending two years in a refugee camp in Saudi Arabia, the Al-Saidy
family resettled in Lincoln, Nebraska. Fearing that his daughters
were sexually active, the father arranged their marriages to the two
men, also refugees from Southern Iraq. After the older daughter ran
away to the home of a male friend, the father and husband came
looking for the daughters at school, and the police became involved.
The girls were placed in foster care, and the parents were arrested
and charged with child abuse.77 The two husbands, Majed Al-
Tamimy and Latif Al-Hussaini, were charged with first-degree sexual
assault of a child, faced up to fifty-year sentences, and were
eventually sentenced to four to six years in prison." The elder
daughter was sent to a home for girls in Omaha, the younger was
placed in foster care.79
Attorneys for Al-Hussaini and Al-Tamimy suggested that they had
married the sisters in accordance with their religion, asserted that in
the "Arab world," the charges were viewed as religious persecution,'
and called the case "a clash between cultural mores and U.S. law."81
Predictably, the media reported this to be a case about "Muslim
mores" and "Iraqi culture." However, a spokesperson from the
Lincoln Islamic Foundation explained that, while Islamic law does
not set a minimum age for marriage, women in contemporary Iraq
typically marry at seventeen or eighteen.' Another observer
indicated that while thirty years ago marriages of young teenage girls
were not uncommon in Iraq, especially in the rural areas, today such
practices are rare.83 Nevertheless, as with the Quintana/Sotelo case,
many deemed this single incident definitive of Iraqi culture.
76. Margaret Talbot, Baghdad on the Plains, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 11, 1997, at 18.
77. See id.
78. See Iraqis Who Married Teens Sent to Prison, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Sept. 24,
1997, at 12A. In Nebraska, the crime of statutory rape applies to sex between one person who
is 19 years of age or more and another who is 14 years old or younger. See NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-320.01 (1999).
79. See Therapy Ordered for Man Who Made Daughters Marry, DES MOINES REG., June
14, 1997, at 10.
80. Larry Fruhling, They Say Marriage; Law Says Rape, DES MOINES REG., Jan. 5, 1997, at
1.
81. J.L. Schmidt, Iraqi Father Is Jailed For "Marrying Off" 2 Young Girls, AUSTIN AM.-
STATESMAN, Nov. 20, 1996, at A16.
82. See id.
83. See Iraqi Father of Child Brides Claims Culture as a Defense, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, Dec. 4, 1996, at 39A.
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Moreover, the Al-Saidy incident was almost universally depicted
as threatening American values. The media described the incident as
"a clash of the culture of newcomers with American mores and law.
It is a conflict shrouded in issues of multiculturalism and ignorance
of the ways of a strange new world."' One woman wrote to the
Lincoln Journal-Star, "We cannot change our laws to suit the
backward, primitive values of some immigrants, or we shall find our
country in the same shape as Iraq."' The Omaha World Herald
editorialized:
[M]ulticulturalism goes too far if it insists that all cultures are
equally valid. Or if it requires the dominant culture, the
American culture in this case, always to yield in cultural
clashes .... In a Western nation, the West's cultural traditions
undergird the law. People who immigrate to this country and
enjoy its opportunity and freedoms need to understand that
arranged child marriages won't be tolerated.'
In this view, "newcomers" import primitive and backward values,
threatening the Western cultural traditions that undergird America,
land of freedom and opportunity.
C. Nation, Gender, and Sexuality
Why are the child marriages of nonwhite immigrants but not white
Christian sects perceived as threatening Western cultural traditions?
Contrasting "progressive" Western traditions to the "primitive" and
"barbaric" lends credibility to the idea that Western culture is
progressiveY Though no one depicted the Kingston case as reflecting
modern and enlightened practices, the Mormon community was not
condemned as a barbaric outsider culture threatening a racialized
national narrative of enlightened progress. Significantly, while both
the Kingston and Al-Saidy cases conjured the rhetoric of religious
freedom, only the Iraqi community possessed, in the eyes of Western
observers, the undesirable behavior of a racialized culture.
The contrast between the cultural traditions of the West and those
of immigrants with "backward, primitive values" is somewhat ironic,
84. Id.
85. Rick Montgomery, Iraqi Grooms Charged with Raping Brides; Nebraska Case Spurs
Argument over Muslim Mores in the U.S., KANSAS CITY STAR, Dec. 15, 1996, at Al (quoting a
letter to the Lincoln Journal-Star).
86. Editorial, Marriage Custom of Another Land Puts Political Correctness to Test,
OMAHA WORLD HERALD, Dec. 5, 1996, at 26.
87. As Edward Said has written, Orientalism dichotomizes the human condition into a
"we" and a "they," essentializing the resulting other. When a dominant group essentializes a
subordinated group by focusing on selected traits to describe the group as a whole, the
dominant group defines its own characteristics-civilized, progressive-in contrast to the
group that is subordinated. See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 45, at 227-28.
[Vol. 12:89
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as Western cultural traditions include child marriage and early
sexuality. Ten years of age was the age of consent under English
common law, as well as the age of consent in most states in 1885,
when agitation to reform statutory rape law first began in the United
States.8' At that point the age of consent in Delaware was only seven
years of age. 9
Despite this, many commentators believe that cases such as the
one in Nebraska threaten a long-standing Western tradition of
valuing women and children. They point to cases of forced
marriage,' Asian immigrant parent-child suicide, Hmong marriage
by capture, female genital mutilation, and "wife killing" by nonwhite
immigrants to assert that multiculturalism has gone too far. In their
view, multiculturalism and feminism cannot coexist: Multiculturalism
must give way, and feminism must triumph.91
Admittedly, attorneys are complicit in offering "cultural"
explanations for behavior, and in cases involving immigrant
defendants attorneys will frequently attempt to introduce cultural
evidence to explain the social context of their clients' acts, and will
thus raise the specter of cultureY But attorneys' "cultural defense"
strategies do not seem sufficient to explain the popular assumption
that only immigrant cultures originating in Asia, Latin America,
Africa, and the Middle East jeopardize feminist progress. For one,
any criminal defendant is entitled to raise social context evidence,
including cultural factors, to explain her acts.93 Nevertheless, when
88. See Larson, supra note 35, at 2.
89. See id. at 2 n.9. Until recently, the age of consent was 14 in South Carolina and 13 in
North Carolina. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.7A (1995) (raising the age of consent from 13 to
16); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-140 (West 1999) (changing the age from 14 to 16 in 1996);
Maryanne Lyons, Adolescents in Jeopardy: An Analysis of Texas' Promiscuity Defense for
SexualAssault, 29 HOUs. L. REv. 583, 609 (1992).
90. For example, Doriane Coleman has stated:
Liberals tend to think we should embrace multiculturalism and be more lenient with
these people.... [However, Iraqi marriage customs] tend to be patriarchal in nature
[and] bad for women and bad for children.... The interests of our society in protecting
women and children and our society's interest in having uniform laws outweigh our
interest in multiculturalism.
Marriage Custom, supra note 86, at 26 (quoting Doriane Coleman).
91. See, e.g., Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through
Multiculturalism: The Liberals' Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1996).
92. See supra Parts I.A, II.A (describing how attorneys representing Pedro Sotelo and the
defendants in the Al-Saidy case suggested that their clients were following Mexican culture
and religious tradition, respectively).
93. Our criminal justice system allows the admission of any relevant social context
evidence. The issue of culture is admissible in criminal cases like any other evidence: It must be
relevant, its probative value must outweigh its prejudicial effect, and it must not have the
tendency to mislead the trier of fact. What is at issue in cases involving cultural evidence is the
weight it is given, the responsibility of prosecutors to introduce additional evidence regarding
culture so that perceptions of culture are not distorted, judicial training on cultural issues, and
the question of qualifications of expert witnesses who testify about cultural practices. See
2000]
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certain immigrant defendants present cultural factors that implicate
sex-subordinating practices, we presume them to be the beneficiaries
of a special treatment that is tolerated as a necessary concomitant of
the pluralistic values of multiculturalism.94 What facilitates the
assumption that this is special treatment? Why presume that
immigrant communities bring to the United States a deviant and
demented culture that is fundamentally different from "ours"?
Narratives that emerge from these "cultural defense" cases reinforce
a pre-existing presumption that misogynist acts are typical of and
unique to certain immigrant cultures.
What appears truly to underlie the assumption of a peculiarly
misogynistic immigrant culture is the relationship between
nationalism, gender, sexuality, and race. National identities,
expressed here as "American values," often coalesce around
women's bodies. Racializing sex-subordinating practices allows
problematic behavior to be projected beyond the borders of a nation
and located on the bodies of racialized immigrant subjects.
The interaction of these factors deserves scrutiny. The control of
women and their sexuality is crucial to maintaining and reproducing
the identity of communities and nations.95 As Anne McClintock and
others have demonstrated, images of nations are constructed in
terms of familial and domestic metaphors, where women are located
as the symbolic center and boundary marker of the nation.96 In this
scheme, women are mothers of the nation and guardians of its purity
and honor. Purity and honor survive when women engage only in
generally Holly Maguigan, Cultural Evidence and Male Violence: Are Feminist and
Multiculturalist Reformers on a Collision Course in Criminal Courts?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REv. 36
(1995); Leti Volpp, Talking "Culture": Gender, Race, Nation and the Politics of
Multiculturalism, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1573 (1996) [hereinafter Volpp, Talking "Culture"]. As I
have argued elsewhere, I think that defense attorneys should also be cognizant of the broader
ramifications, in the form of perpetuating stereotypes, that accompany presenting cultural
evidence made up of crass caricatures of an immigrant's culture, although I also recognize that
defense attorneys are ethically bound to represent their clients zealously. See Leti Volpp,
(Mis)Identifying Culture: Asian Women and the "Cultural Defense," 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J.
57, 93-100 (1994) [hereinafter Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture]. For further discussion of the
risks that accompany presenting evidence that relies on group-based stereotypes, see SHERENE
RAZACK, LOOKING WHITE PEOPLE IN THE EYE: GENDER, RACE, AND CULTURE IN
COURTROOMS AND CLASSROOMS (1998); Leti Volpp, Gazing Back, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 149 (1999) (review of RAZACK, supra).
94. Our law is already embedded with cultural norms that reflect gender subordination,
such as the doctrine of provocation. The voluntary manslaughter law of most jurisdictions
recognizes the sight of a wife's adultery as a valid motivation to kill. See Donna K. Coker, Heat
of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S
STUD. 71 (1992). For the argument that access to cultural evidence is far from special
treatment but is, in fact, what is required to assure equal protection, given the existence of the
doctrine of provocation, see James J. Sing, Note, Culture as Sameness: Toward a Synthetic View
of Provocation and Culture in the Criminal Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1845 (1999).
95. See, e.g., JAN JINDY PETTMAN, WORLDING WOMEN: A FEMINIST INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS 59 (1996).
96. See MCCLINTOCK, supra note 53, at 354-57.
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sexual relations that are heteronormative and occur within the
confines of state-sanctioned marriage that controls the reproduction
of the state's citizenry.' The nation also depends on the family as a
unit through which the stability of gender roles is preserved."
Adolescent premarital sexuality creates anxiety,' so the state seeks
to direct this prohibited sexuality into appropriate channels, such as
early marriage. Thus, we find statutes that legislate the acceptability
of marriage at ages as young as thirteen with proof of pregnancy
and/or parental consent, and reluctance to increase the age of
consent lest the law promote promiscuity or illegitimate births.
What is the role of race in this process? Nationalist ideologies are
often concerned with racial purity and subject women to
reproductive and other forms of control 0 to achieve this aim. In the
cases of forced and voluntary adolescent marriage discussed here,
the racialized bodies and community control over the sexuality of
immigrant girls appear to rupture a national fabric that is
97. As Jacqui Alexander points out:
The nation has always been conceived in heterosexuality, since biology and reproduction
are at the heart of its impulse. The citizenship machinery is also located here, in the sense
that the prerequisites of good citizenship and loyalty to the nation are simultaneously
sexualized and hierarchized into a class of good, loyal, reproducing heterosexual citizens,
and a subordinated, marginalized class of non-citizens ....
M. Jacqui Alexander, Erotic Autonomy as a Politics of Decolonization: An Anatomy of State
Practice in the Bahamas Tourist Economy, in FEMINIST GENEALOGIES, COLONIAL LEGACIES,
DEMOCRATIC FuTURES 63, 84 (M. Jacqui Alexander & Chandra Mohanty eds., 1997).
98. See Gayatri Gopinath, Nostalgia, Desire, Diaspora: South Asian Sexualities in Motion, 5
POSITIONS 467, 468 (1997).
99. For discussions of anxieties caused by adolescent sexuality, see Elizabeth Hollenberg,
The Criminalization of Teenage Sex: Statutory Rape and the Politics of Teenage Motherhood, 10
STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 267 (1999) (describing an increase in statutory rape prosecutions and
the adoption of criminal justice policies in the name of social welfare programming); Megan
Weinstein, The Teenage Pregnancy "Problem": Welfare Reform and the Personal Responsibility
and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 13 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 117 (1998)
(describing debates over the welfare reform act (PRWORA) and provisions of the law that
attempt to discourage unwed motherhood).
100. Thus we see mass rape of women by men attempting to destroy communities and
nations; for example, Serbian men raped Bosnian Muslim women as part of a policy of "ethnic
cleansing." These rapes functioned both to destroy what was symbolically configured as
national honor in the form of women's bodies, and to forcibly impregnate women with Serbian
babies. See PETTMAN, supra note 95, at 101.
An example of other forms of control is the relationship of women and community identity
post-Partition in India and Pakistan. Partition and the creation of Pakistan was accompanied
by mass abduction and separation of women from their families: An estimated 50,000 Muslim
women in India and 33,000 non-Muslim women in Pakistan were abducted, abandoned, or
separated from their families. After Partition, both countries pursued "recovery operations" to
reclaim these women. Some of these women had married and been absorbed into their new
communities, so that their recovery was forced, especially when they were required to leave
children behind. Ritu Menon and Kamila Bhasin interrogate why the matter of national honor
was so closely bound up with women's bodies, and answer that both governments pursued
communal identities-as Hindu (India) or Muslim (Pakistan), despite India's avowed
secularism-that located women as boundary markers of identity. See Ritu Menon & Kamla
Bhasin, Recovery, Rupture, Resistance: Abduction of Women During Partition, ECON. & POL.
WKLY., Apr. 24, 1993, at WS-2.
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presumptively both white and progressive. The sexuality of
immigrant adolescent girls of color is marked as a racialized threat to
a national cultural consensus about appropriate female sexuality and
responses to that sexuality.
Women's bodies serve as "boundary markers of the nation"'' in
the context of charting societal progress. In nationalist discourse the
figure of the woman acts as a primary marker of an essential
communal identity or tradition."° Women, home, family, and nation
become conflated so that women serve to signify a community's
culture and tradition. °3 As a result, perceptions of the relative
treatment of women have historically been used to assess the
progress of a culture and to justify subjugation of different
populations in the name of a racialized gender uplift. For example,
British colonial rule was justified, in part, in terms of a civilizing
mission that cast British colonizers as protecting oppressed native
women from their victimization by native males. °' This construction
was accomplished by disregarding the agency of native women and
denying the sexism endemic to Britain at the time. 5 Thus, women's
bodies frequently serve as the terrain on which progress is measured.
A nation can consolidate its identity by projecting beyond its own
borders the sexual practices or gender behaviors it deems
abhorrent."°  Thus, even while voluntary or forced adolescent
marriages occur within white American communities, we do not
conceptualize these practices as cultural phenomena characterizing
white America. Rather, this undesirable behavior is projected
beyond U.S. borders and characterized as an abhorrent practice
imported by immigrants that undermines enlightened Western
norms." This projection allows the United States to maintain a self-
101. Editorial, 44 FEMINIST REv. 1, 1 (1993) ("Nationalism is gendered: women's bodies
are the boundary of the nation, and the bearers of its future"), quoted in PETrMAN, supra note
95, at 59.
102. See Gopinath, supra note 98, at 468.
103. See PARTHA CHATrERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS: COLONIAL AND
POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES 116-57 (1993) (describing this process in the Indian context).
104. Another primary justification was the "effeminacy" of the native male that was
thought to render him incapable of self-governance. See generally ANTOINETTE BURTON,
BURDENS OF HISTORY: BRITISH FEMINISTS, INDIAN WOMEN, AND IMPERIAL CULTURE,
1865-1915 (1994).
105. As one example, British colonial officials in Egypt specifically invoked the veil and
treatment of women under Islam as a justification for colonialism. The British consul general,
Lord Cromer, vociferous in making these claims, was also a founding member of the Men's
League for Opposing Women's Suffrage in England. See LEILA AHMED, WOMEN AND
GENDER IN ISLAM: HISTORICAL ROOTS OF A MODERN DEBATE 152-53 (1992).
106. See Introduction to NATIONALISMS AND SEXUALITtES 10 (Andrew Parker et al. eds.,
1992).
107. When African-Americans are the "other" accused of engaging in deviant behavior,
the backdrop of normalcy shifts from "Western" values to those of white America.
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image as a progressive state with a progressive culture -especially in
the arena of women's rights-by naming as "other" the source of
backward behavior." s This process occurs even when such practices
are not unique to immigrants of color but in fact are legally
condoned by statute, as is the case for voluntary adolescent
marriage," or, if illegal, appear among native-born whites as well as
immigrants.
III. FEMINISM AND MULTICULTURALISM
Advocates and scholars have attempted to problematize the
conflation of racialized immigrant communities and regressive sex-
subordinating culture in a variety of contexts, including female
genital surgeries and so-called "cultural defenses.' 10°  These
108. Bonnie Honig makes what I see as an important and analogous argument that we
press foreigners into service on behalf of certain institutions, such as capitalism, community,
and family, that seem incapable of sustaining themselves. This takes both xenophilic and
xenophobic turns. An example of a xenophilic turn would be when new immigrants are
symbolically mobilized to renormalize the native-born into traditional heterosexual gender
roles, while "we" supposedly normalize "them" into a new national citizenship. For this Honig
proffers a reading of the film Strictly Ballroom and an example of a trade in foreign brides-
namely, the way in which immigrant women, supposedly more traditionally socialized into
gender roles, properly shore up heterosexual marriages for those men seeking the way
marriage is "supposed" to be. An example of a xenophobic turn would be the manner in which
patriarchal immigrants are seen as threats to what Honig calls the rough gender equalities that
are American liberal democracy's ambiguous achievement. See Bonnie Honig, Immigrant
America? How Foreignness "Solves" Democracy's Problems, 16 Soc. TExT 56, 63-67 (1998).
109. I recognize that an act may be legally condoned in a statute because it happened
historically and rarely occurs in the contemporary moment. However, this is not the case with
adolescent marriage. For example, Kentucky amended its marriage laws in March 1998 to
outlaw marriage of children under 16-unless the girl is pregnant, and a district judge
approves. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 402.020 (1998). Between 1994 and 1996, 1,300 girls who
were 15 or younger received marriage licenses in Kentucky; 71 of them were 12 or 13. See
Beverly Bartlett, Three Legislators Bungled Vows on Bill to Ban Child Brides, COURIER-J.
(Louisville, Ky.), Feb. 9, 1998, at IF; Al Cross, Bill Limiting Child Marriages Signed into Law
by Governor, COURIER-J., Mar. 27, 1998, at 4B. Significantly, some legislators attempted to
sink the bill by tying it to a provision allowing same-sex marriage. See Legislative Briefs,
COURIER-J., Mar. 20, 1998, at 48. Some legislators argued that the teen marriage provision
would infringe on personal freedom. Others said that it should be defended by the First
Amendment protection of freedom of religion. See Bartlett, supra, at 1F.
In addition, the media reports of the frequency of adolescent marriage in Maryland indicate
that until the state amended the law in April 1999, see supra note 7, statutory approval of this
practice was not solely a historical artifact. See Close to Home, supra note 7. Robert P.
Duckworth, the clerk of the Anne Arundel Circuit Court, in his testimony to the Maryland
House Judiciary Committee on House Bill 388 (the bill seeking to amend the state's marriage
laws) reported:
Two weeks ago.., a very pregnant 15-year-old bride entered our wedding room. Her
partner was an immature lad of 16 years, barely able to drive.... They were escorted by
both sets of consenting moms and dads.... But more troublesome than these weddings
are the adolescent-adult weddings and child-adult weddings.... An expectant, 11-year-
old girl arrived at a Maryland courthouse last year to wed a 21-year-old adult.... Sadly,
the couple tied the knot, and their abominable union was "blessed" by the state under
the approving eyes of the pubescent bride's parents.
Id. at B8.
110. See, e.g., UMA NARAYAN, DISLOCATING CULTURES: IDENTITIES, TRADITIONS,
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individuals have recognized that culture is neither static nor
homogenous and that culture is experienced and described variously
by individuals situated differently within a particular community.
Further, these commentators have argued that every community is
characterized by both patriarchy and resistance to patriarchy, and
that women are agents, not just passive subjects of their culture."'
But these attempts to create a complex and accurate
understanding of culture often go unheard. Susan Moller Okin
recently used the Iraqi case as a launching pad to criticize
multiculturalism in an essay titled, Is Multiculturalism Bad for
Women?"2  (Her answer: "Yes.' '113) Okin asserts that there are
fundamental conflicts between a commitment to gender equity and a
multiculturalist respect for minority cultures, as illustrated by the Al-
Saidy case, French schoolchildren wearing headscarves, African
immigrant polygamous marriages, female clitoridectomy in
immigrant communities, Hmong marriage by capture, parent-child
suicide by Japanese and Chinese immigrants, and "wife murder by
immigrants from Asian and Middle Eastern countries whose wives
have either committed adultery or treated their husbands in a servile
way... 4 In Okin's account, these examples reflect ethnic difference,
which in turn represents moral difference. Okin then argues that we
THIRD-WORLD FEMINISM (1997); RAZACK, supra note 93; SCATTERED HEGEMONIES:
POSTMODERNITY AND TRANSNATIONAL FEMINIST PRACTICES (Inderpal Grewal & Caren
Kaplan eds., 1994); Lama Abu-Odeh, Comparatively Speaking: The "Honor" of the "East" and
the "Passion" of the "West," 1997 UTAH L. REV. 287; Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant
Perception, World Traveling, and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital
Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189 (1991-92); Bonnie Honig, My Culture Made Me
Do It, in SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? (Joshua Cohen et
al. eds., 1999); Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human
Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. L.J. 1 (1995); Hope Lewis &
Isabelle R. Gunning, Cleaning Our Own House: "Exotic" and Familiar Human Rights
Violations, 4 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 123 (1998); Volpp, (Mis)ldentifying Culture, supra note
93, at 57; Volpp, Talking "Culture, " supra note 93, at 1573.
111. See generally sources cited supra note 110.
112. SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, in IS MULTI-
CULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN?, supra note 110, at 9.
113. Id. Margaret Talbot, writing in The New Republic, has similarly used the Iraqi case as
a basis to criticize the undermining of the basic precept that immigrants must "respect
American laws." She asserts that this case pits "respect for other cultures and sympathy for
miserable refugees against a belief in a certain autonomy -personhood, really-for women
and children" and writes that "the girls deserved the protection of American law, even if it
embodied a notion of rights that had no place in the world of their father." See Talbot, supra
note 76, at 20-22.
114. OKIN, supra note 112, at 18. While Okin does write that Western cultures "of course
still practice many forms of sex discrimination," and notes that "virtually all of the world's
cultures have distinctly patriarchal pasts," she asserts that some cultures-mostly Western
liberal cultures-have departed further from patriarchal pasts than others. Id. at 16. Her
conclusion: Female members of "a more patriarchal minority culture" may "be much better off
if the culture into which they were born were either to become extinct," so its members would
be integrated "into the less sexist surrounding culture," or if the culture were "encouraged to
alter itself so as to reinforce the equality of women." Id. at 22-23.
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must choose universalist values that respect women rather than
succumbing to the multiculturalist or relativist disinclination to judge
difference.
To assert that these cases reveal a tension between multi-
culturalism and feminism is not only to rely upon a caricature of the
culture of immigrant communities and communities of color, but also
to posit very specific and problematic versions of feminism and of
multiculturalism."' These discussions assume a feminism that
replicates the colonialist feminism of a century ago. In the colonialist
paradigm, native women were completely passive subjects of a native
male subordination that grossly exceeded that experienced by
women in the West."6 Colonialist feminism emerged, in this account,
in order to uplift the suffering women of the "East."".7 This brand of
feminism was used to justify colonization as part of a civilizing
process, along with the rule of law, education, and Christianity."'
The assumption of this strand of feminist theory, reflected in
Okin's perspective, that immigrant women require liberation
through induction into the progressive social mores and customs of
the metropolitan West, has been subjected to significant criticism."9
Critics have pointed to the manner in which feminists describe
"other" women as "always/already victim,""'2 passively waiting to be
rescued from cultural norms that mysteriously impose no restraints
on Western feminists.
Just as these discussions perpetuate a distorted feminism, they
assume a multiculturalism that resembles crude cultural relativism.
Under a multicultural regime, this discourse suggests that we as a
115. See Volpp, Talking "Culture," supra note 93, at 1577-84, 1607-11.
116. For example, British suffragist Josephine Butler lamented that Indian women were:
indeed between the upper and nether millstone, helpless, voiceless, hopeless. Their
helplessness appeals to the heart, somewhat in the same way... in which the helplessness
and suffering of a dumb animal does, under the knife of a vivisector.... Somewhere, half
way between the Martyr Saints and the tortured "friend of man" the noble dog, stand, it
seems to me, these pitiful Indian women, girls, children, as many of them are. They have
not even the small power of resistance [like] the western wom[a]n [who] ... may have
some clearer knowledge of a just and pitiful God to whom she may make her mute
appeal.
VRON WARE, BEYOND THE PALE: WHITE WOMEN, RACISM, AND HISTORY 156-67 (1992)
(quoting Josephine Butler).
117. See generally BURTON, supra note 104; WARE, supra note 116; WESTERN WOMEN
AND IMPERIALISM: COMPLICITY AND RESISTANCE (Nupur Chaudhuri & Margaret Strobel
eds., 1992).
118. See sources cited supra note 117.
119. See, e.g., NARAYAN, supra note 110; Hazel V. Carby, White Woman Listen! Black
Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood, in THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK: RACE AND
RACISM IN 70s BRITAIN 212 (CCCS eds., 1982); Chandra Mohanty, Under Western Eyes:
Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses, in THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND THE POLITICS
OF FEMINISM 51 (Chandra T. Mohanty et al. eds., 1991).
120. See generally Lata Mani, Multiple Mediations: Feminist Scholarship in the Age of
Multinational Reception, 35 FEMINIST REv. 24 (1990); Mohanty, supra note 119.
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society would be unable to critique any culture and would be forced
to accept the bizarre customs and behaviors of nonwhites at the
expense of long-cherished American principles. 2' This portrayal of
multiculturalism relies on problematic assumptions. First, it invents a
homogenous, "American" tradition of principles, a monoculturalism
of transcendent values with a "we" or "us" at an unwavering center
of rationality. This assumption is historically inaccurate, relying upon
distortions and marginalizations for its narrative coherence."
Second, this account confuses the multiculturalist valuation of ethnic
particularity with a defense of cultural relativism."3 Valuing
difference does not destroy our ability to judge among differences.'"
We need not rely upon "long-cherished Western principles" that
masquerade as universal values in order to make critical judgments
about gender-subordinating practices."
As Homi Bhabha has recently written, the construction of a
conflict between feminism and multiculturalism relies on the
monolithic characterizations of minority, migrant cultures.'26 Such a
construction mistakenly presumes the "Western" domestic scene to
be egalitarian and empowering; depicts minorities as abject
121. The meaning of multiculturalism has been the subject of enormous debate. For
examples of works that examine the various meanings of multiculturalism, see MAPPING
MULTICULTURALISM (Avery F. Gordon & Christopher Newfield eds., 1996);
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION (Amy Gutmann ed.,
1994); PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991).
122. For a re-reading of historical experience where the social condition of people is
prevailingly migratory and heterogeneous, as opposed to homogenous, see David Theo
Goldberg, Introduction: Multicultural Conditions, in MULTICULTURALISM: A CRITICAL
READER 1, 20-25 (David Theo Goldberg ed., 1994).
123. See id. at 16. As Goldberg points out, the collapsing of ethnic particularity with
relativism has been facilitated by the failure of some academics to theorize the implications of
a nonessentializing multicultural commitment. See id. at 15.
124. Note that if we were to carry the valuing of difference to an extreme, this logic-that
we can both value difference and judge among difference--collapses. See Stanley Fish,
Boutique Multiculturalism, in MULTICULTURALISM AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 69 (Arthur
M. Melzer et al. eds., 1998). Fish argues that if one values difference as a general principle so
seriously, one becomes unable to value any particular difference seriously, since this embrace
of the principle of difference will inevitably involve the suppression of particularized
difference. This is because the imperatives of a distinctive culture will impinge on the freedom
of some other distinctive culture. If one decides, in response, that a commitment to respecting
a particular culture -is so strong that one stays the course no matter what, one no longer is a
multiculturalist, but becomes a uni- or monoculturalist. As Fish suggests, rather than become
lost in this abstracted philosophical maze, it might be more constructive to recognize
multiculturalism as a demographic fact and to search for particular solutions to particular
problems. See id. at 73-75.
125. For an example, see Joan Williams, Rorty, Radicalism, Romanticism: The Politics of
the Gaze, 1992 WIS. L. REv. 131. In defending a nonfoundationalist ethics, Williams suggests
that we are capable of making moral judgments even when we recognize that our moral
certainties reflect particular cultural values, rather than perceiving them to be reflective of
eternal truth.
126. See Homi K. Bhabha, Liberalism's Sacred Cow, in IS MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR
WOMEN?, supra note 110, at 79, 79.
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"subjects" of their cultures of origin "huddled in the gazebo of group
rights, preserving the orthodoxy of their distinctive cultures in the
midst of the great storm of Western progress";"' and assumes that
Western liberal values-utterly foreign to immigrant communities-
will lead to their salvation."
Juxtaposing these narratives of similar stories differently perceived
illustrates how distinctive interpretative lenses are applied to
virtually identical behavior according to the actors' identity.'29 Our
society considers the voluntary pregnancy and marriage of a young
teenage girl to an older man to be the act of an aberrant individual
when the girl is white, but considers it to reflect a more primitive
culture when the girl is a Mexican immigrant. Under the prevailing
view, a father forcing his young teenage daughters into marriage is a
cultural act demonstrating the evils of multiculturalism when the
actors are Iraqi immigrants, but not when they are white and
Mormon. Society presumes that immigrants of color are passive
victims dominated by their cultural traditions, in contrast to the
rational actors of Western liberalism.
The consequences of selectively blaming culture in this way are
striking: These discursive practices cause us to overlook specific
relations of power, both in "other" cultures and in our own society.
In hasty expressions of distaste for other cultures perceived as
primitive and backward, we miss the complex ways in which power
actually functions in particular communities.
A specific example may help to clarify this point. In a recent
article, Katherine Franke examines how our choice to label certain
practices as "sexual" eclipses important implications of behavior. 3
One of her examples is the anthropological report of ritualized
practices in a community where boys must fellate older men as part
of the process of becoming a man.' It is easy to feel disgust at the
daily ingestion of semen by seven-year-old boys-to label this
127. Id. at 80.
128. See id. at 83-84.
129. The assumption that the behavior of white people reflects individual acts, while
similar acts committed by immigrants of color reflect group identity, demonstrates the
contours of what underlies discrimination.
130. See Katherine Franke, Putting Sex to Work, 75 DENV. U. L. REV. 1139 (1998)
(examining the assault of Abner Louima by white New York City police officers, sex-related
violence against civilians in the former Yugoslavia, and ritualized man/boy fellatio in Papua
New Guinea).
131. See generally id.; see also GILBERT HERDT, GUARDIANS OF THE FLUTE: IDIOMS OF
MASCULINITY (1981); GILBERT HERDT, SAMBIA SEXUAL CULTURE: ESSAYS FROM THE
FIELD (1999). Many of these practices no longer persist. As Richard Schweder writes, these
accounts have had great prominence in the lore of anthropology. Yet after a few years of
contact with the West, "almost everything that was exotic about New Guinea seems to have
disappeared." Richard A. Schweder, Why Do Men Barbeque? And Other Postmodern Ironies
of Growing Up in the Decade of Ethnicity, 122 DAEDALUS 279, 285 (1993).
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practice as a symptom of a horrifically bad culture, and to
dehumanize those who would engage in such practices.32
Alternatively, one could, as various commentators have, describe
these practices as fundamentally homoerotic, as evidence of an
exotic manifestation of homosexual behavior. Both of these
responses distance the observer from the culture observed,
connecting the evaluation of the "other" culture to the observer's
self-image. One interpretation is condemnatory, the other laudatory;
one unreflectively says "that is not me," the other says "that is me.. 33
The former calls the practice culture, the latter calls it sex. Both miss
the way this sexual practice signifies and enforces power relations.
As Franke describes, the fellatio is accompanied by nose-bleeding
through the use of sharp grasses, as well as cane-swallowing to
induce vomiting and defecation. The purpose of these rituals is to
purge female body fluids that the male child inherited from the
mother."3 Boys are isolated from all women and taught that women
are polluters who will deplete their masculine substance, which they
must ingest in the form of semen required for boys to grow. Franke
writes that, rather than considering these practices principally
homoerotic and calling them "sexual," we can more appropriately
understand them as part of a larger indoctrination process whereby
boys learn and internalize gender norms premised upon misogyny
and male superiority.'35 We could therefore argue that what is
eclipsed in the selective labeling as sexual-or as cultural-is the
relation of these practices to the specific manner in which gender
structures social relations.'36
132. In a forthcoming article, Martha Nussbaum describes the role of the emotion of
disgust in different legal spheres, and notes that the male ingestion of semen is met with a
greater level of disgust than the female ingestion of semen, since females are differentiated
from men because they are considered receptacles for disgusting body fluids. See Martha C.
Nussbaum, "Secret Sewers of Vice": Disgust, Bodies and the Law, in THE PASSIONS OF JUSTICE
(Susan Bandes ed., forthcoming 2000).
133. Franke writes: "[Gilbert] Herdt... was one of the first Western observers to
encounter the Sambia practices and declare: Look, homosexuality. Hallelujah, we are
everywhere!" Franke, supra note 130, at 1146.
134. See id. at 1150.
135. See id. at 1151-52.
136. How precisely we could understand these practices as relating to the way gender
structures social relations may be quite complicated. Marilyn Strathern, attempting to convey
Melanesian knowledge practices as though they were a series of analyses for the way things
seem from the point of view of Western anthropological and feminist preoccupations, argues
that "male" and "female" might be understood not as motivating principles at work in society,
but as conventional descriptions of the forms in which Melanesians make persons and things
known. See MARILYN STRATHERN, THE GENDER OF THE GIFr: PROBLEMS WITH WOMEN
AND PROBLEMS WITH SOCIETY IN MELANESIA 309-10 (1988). She writes that understanding
male initiation as simply a differentiation from women looks at individuals as they are
recruited into their sex as if they are individuals recruited into clan groups. See id. at 64.
Among the drawbacks of such an approach, she suggests, is the assumption that identity
consists in the possession of qualifying attributes, in whether an individual "has" the
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The condemnatory reaction, which distances the observer from the
practice and defines the observer as the antithesis of that practice,
relies upon and perpetuates a failure to see subordinating practices
in our own culture when, for example, young girls are forced to
engage in non-consensual sex or are battered in the process of
"becoming a woman."'37 When we gaze with condemnation at other
cultures, we can miss the fact that "our" culture is also characterized
by problematic, sex-subordinating behavior. The cases of adolescent
marriage should make us rethink the belief that culturally-based
subordination of women and girls is a phenomenon particular to
immigrant communities of color. So long as we chalk up sexist
behavior in other communities to their "culture," we must critically
examine the fact that American culture is characterized by, for
example, epidemic rates of male violence against women.
Alternatively, if we say that we reject sexism as part of "our
culture"-that some of us claim that domestic violence, for example,
has no part of "our culture"-we should similarly recognize that
segments of other communities are also engaged in a process of
rejecting sexism as part of "their culture."
Extraterritorializing of problematic behavior by projecting it
beyond the borders of "American values" has the effect both of
equating racialized immigrant culture with sex-subordination, and
denying the reality of gendered subordination prevalent in
mainstream white America. The failure to interrogate these effects
has real-life consequences. These assumptions about gender, race,
culture, and nation do not solely raise questions of descriptive
representation; they result in shifts in material reality and in
distributions of power. While the sexist culture of immigrants of
characteristics that make him unambiguously masculine. See id. at 64-65.
Strathem argues that this is a naive correspondence between the sexed individual and the
autonomy of "male" and "female" viewpoints. See id. at 64. For example, she points to the way
in which the gender of sexual organs depends on what you do with them. See id. at 128, 211.
The difference between male and female is created through rites, and it is a difference that
turns on interaction, not attributes. Persons are not masculinized, rather persons masculinize
their own organs and sexual substance. The rituals occur, not to make boys, as a special
category, into men, but to ensure that they will have the internal capacity to procreate, to be
fathers. And men do not in any simple way become men. They are androgynous beings
composed of male and female elements, and are produced as male out of an opposite, female
form. See id. at 211-13.
137. Many American teens learn that experiencing domestic violence is part of being a
woman. Forty percent of teenage girls aged 14-17 report knowing someone their age who has
been hit or beaten by a boyfriend. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, Domestic Violence Is
a Serious, Widespread Social Problem in America: The Facts (visited Nov. 14, 1999),
<http://www.fvpf.org/facts>. Eight percent of high-school-age girls said "yes" when asked if "a
boyfriend or date has ever forced sex against your will." Id. The "most conservative data"
available on the prevalence of father-daughter incest suggests that 1.3% of American women
will experience it. At this estimate, 1.6 million American women are now or have been victims
of incest. See Lisa Elder, Former Miss America to Speak at Forum on Child Abuse, DAILY
OKLAHOMAN, Mar. 6,1996, at 13.
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color is used to justify calls for immigration exclusion (some race-
based, some not),"3 there appears to be little headway against the
shocking incidence of domestic violence in nearly one-third of
intimate relationships in the United States.'39 To be perfectly clear, I
am not pointing out the problematic discursive representations of
racialized communities in these cases in order to assert that these
cultures are not sexist.' Rather, I am calling for an approach to
combat gendered subordination across communities, an approach
that neither attacks the cultures of communities of color based on
racial assumptions, nor presumes that the United States is always a
site of liberation.
138. See Audrey Macklin, Looking at Law Through the Lens of Culture: 3 Canadian
Snapshots 11 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (describing the demand in Canada
to limit immigration from certain countries because male nationals were assumed tb be "wife-
beaters").
The Federation for American Immigration Reform, an organization dedicated to the
principle that the "mass immigration unforeseen over the last 30 years should not continue,"
invokes the Iraqi case in Nebraska to demonstrate why the United States should curb
immigration. Their webpage states:
One of the most immediate effects of the overly high immigration level our country has
today is the growth of groups of people who are not well assimilated into our larger
national culture. This leads to worsening ethnic separatism and related problems....
Language aside, cultural differences alone can create problems. In November 1996, an
Iraqi immigrant was jailed in Nebraska for forcing his 13- and 14-year old daughters to
marry men more than twice their age, who were also jailed for statutory rape. The men
explained that they were following the tradition of their country and did not understand
our government's reaction. As a natural result of cultural conflict, ethnic strife and
separatism grow.
FAIR, Immigration and Ethnic Separatism (visited Nov. 13, 1999), <http://www.fairus.org/html/
04152803.htm>.
Along the same lines, but in a more explicitly racist fashion, in his national bestseller, Peter
Brimelow called for an immediate moratorium on immigration from non-European countries,
arguing that immigration has social consequences, among them the fact that the immigrants
who enter today, compared to European immigrants of the past, are unassimilable and cause
crime. See PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S
IMMIGRATION DISASTER 10, 19, 178-90, 202-21 (1995).
139. Thirty-one percent of American women report being physically or sexually abused by
a husband or boyfriend at some point in their lives, according to a 1998 survey. Thirty percent
of Americans say they know a woman who has been physically abused by her husband or
boyfriend in the past year. Nearly one-fifth of women reported experiencing a completed or
attempted rape at some time in their lives. This violence occurs at similar rates across
communities. See Family Violence Prevention Fund, supra note 137.
140. I will reiterate here that I believe that all cultures are patriarchal. More helpful than
the attempt to categorize cultures on a scale of more patriarchal to less patriarchal would be to
examine how patriarchy manifests itself in ways that are similar and different across cultures or
communities.
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